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Abstract: Because it is differentiated from other employers, the U.S. military 
enjoys some monopsony power. After reviewing existing estimates of the 
elasticity of labor supplied to the military, we obtain new estimates for the Army 
and Navy covering the period from 1998-2007. We employ a control function 
approach to account for the potential endogeneity of enlistment incentives. Our 
elasticity estimates of 2.4 for the Army and .4 for the Navy suggest that the 
services have substantial wage-setting ability. However, the Army faces higher 
supply elasticity since the invasion of Iraq and higher elasticity in states with 
weak support for obligatory military service. 
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A growing research literature provides empirical evidence of monopsonistic behavior by firms in 
the labor market (Boal and Ransom 1997).  An appealing feature of the monopsony model is its 
ability to explain empirical regularities that are difficult to reconcile using a purely competitive 
framework.  Monopsony has been used as a basis of explaining positive employment effects of 
minimum wages (Card 1992), inversions in the wage-tenure profile (Ransom 1993), and the 
gender wage gap (Manning 2003).  Perhaps the most obvious approach to establishing 
monopsonistic behavior is to estimate the labor supply curve for a monopsonistic firm and 
demonstrate that supply elasticities are less than infinite.  As a practical matter, however, 
estimating supply elasticities has proven challenging, both because of difficulties in identifying 
settings in which monopsony is likely to occur, and because of data constraints that make it 
difficult to cleanly separate supply from demand.  In this paper, we consider the U.S. labor 
market for defense services, which provides an obvious candidate for monopsony because the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is the sole legal employer of military personnel.  We draw 
from a unique database on wages and enlistments for the Army and Navy to estimate the wage-
setting power of the U.S. military. 
Although new military recruits represent a fairly small component of the overall young 
adult labor market, the DoD remains an important national employer, particularly for high school 
graduates who do not wish to immediately matriculate into college.  In FY2006, across the active 
component of all services the DoD hired roughly 180,000 new personnel, almost 90% of whom 
were under age 25.  Total active force size was approximately 1.35 million.  However, despite its 
potential to provide interesting insights regarding non-competitive employer behavior, relatively 
few existing studies specifically address the military as a monopsonist.  In an early contribution, Borcherding (1971) argues that monopsonistic behavior will lead to the underprovision of 
personnel for the military and deadweight loss, although he makes no attempt to quantify the 
extent of the welfare effect.  Cooper (1975) considers includes monposonistic deadweight loss as 
one component in his comparison of the volunteer to the conscripted force. Quester and Nakada 
(1983) present a model of the military as a dominant-firm monopsonist and combine their model 
with existing estimated to calculate welfare losses comprising 10-15% of total D.O.D. wage 
expenditures. 
  Although there has been relatively limited discussion of the military as a monopsonist, 
since the advent of the all-volunteer force a robust literature in defense economics has developed 
that estimates supply elasticities of new recruits for the military services.  We first briefly review 
a number of existing studies of enlistment supply, focusing on estimates of the wage elasticity.  
A consistent finding across studies is that wage elasticities are around unity, implying that the 
military enjoys substantial wage-setting power.  We then provide new estimates of the wage 
elasticity for the Army and Navy, focusing on the period from 1998-2007.  Employing a control 
function approach to account for the potential endogeneity of enlistment incentives with respect 
to supply, we estimate a wage elasticity of 2.4 for the Army and .6 for the Navy.  Army wage 
elasticities have risen since the U.S. invasion of Iraq and elasticities are higher in states with low 
approval of the draft. 
 
II. Prior Work Estimating Supply Elasticities for the Military 
 
There is a substantial research literature attempting to estimate supply elasticities for particular 
services or the D.O.D. as a whole dating beginning in the 1970’s.  Table 1 catalogues a number of past studies with enlistment supply estimates.
1  The majority of existing studies focus on 
supply elasticities for so-called high quality recruits, which are recruits with high school 
credentials that have scores of 50 or above on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT).
2  
Whereas enlistment of other recruits is potentially demand constrained, the military accepts all 
high-quality applicants who satisfy its medical, citizenship, and moral standards. 
  Table 1 reveals some variation across studies in the estimated supply elasticities.  Using 
data from 1975-1982 and estimating a linear specification with high-quality contracts as a 
dependent variable, for example, Dale and Gilroy (1985) obtain a supply elasticity for the Army 
of 3.90. Drawing from data covering a later period and estimating a log-log model, Kearl et al. 
(1990) obtain elasticities of only .15.  Navy estimates similarly range between .13 and 2.04.  Part 
of the variation across studies arises due to differences in empirical approaches and control 
variables.  For example, Goldberg (1979) and Hogan et al. (1996) explicitly include controls for 
advertising expenditure, which may shift the supply curve outward or change its shape, while 
many other studies lack information on advertising.  Additionally, some of the variation in 
elasticities may reflect demographic and institutional changes that have occurred over the past 30 
years.  The military experienced substantial downsizing following the end of the Cold War, and 
some research, such as Murray and McDonald (1999), suggest that this development may have 
affected enlistment supply for some services. 
A persistent challenge in identifying the supply elasticity that arises in the military 
context as well as in other markets is the potential endogeneity of wages with respect to supply.  
For the military, other enlistment incentives controlled by the services, such as bonuses and 
                                                 
1 This list is far from exhaustive.  Warner et al. (2001) and Asch et al. (2007) provide a more detailed discussion of 
enlistment supply estimates across studies. 
2 Over the past several years, high quality recruits represented roughly 50% of all Army recruits and 65% of Navy 
recruits. educational benefits, also raise endogeneity concerns.  In a recent contribution, Gelber (2007) 
estimates a high-quality enlistment supply model that attempts to more fully account for wage 
endogeneity.  Gelber instruments for the military wage using the statutory formula that ties pay 
increases to the Employment Cost Index (ECI), essentially identifying the elasticities using the 
component of wage variation that is due to national wage growth.  Gelber finds that 
instrumenting increases the estimated elasticity from around .7 to 1.1. 
Although the elasticities across studies for both the Army and Navy cover an appreciable 
range, the studies are consistent in revealing elasticities substantially below infinity.  In literature 
reviews, Warner and Asch (1995) find an average elasticity across studies of 0.64, while Warner 
et al. (2001) obtain an average of 0.75.  In a standard monopsony framework, these elasticities 
suggest rates of exploitation above 100%, which are substantially above those found in studies of 
other labor markets, such as coal miners (Boal 1995) and nurses (Sullivan 1989). 
Although there is some evidence of a supply relationship that would permit the military 
to offer wages below marginal revenue product, the nature of the enlistment supply function may 
have been affected by the advent of the Global War on Terror and U.S. invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  We focus below on obtaining estimates for the supply elasticity for the period 
between 1998 and 2007 in a manner that accounts for endogeneity of enlistment incentives. 
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
 
We take as our point of departure a static differentiated-employer monopsony model.  The notion 
that military services are viewed differently from each other and from other types of employers 
seems intuitively plausible.  Market research conducted by the military (e.g. Zucker and Boehmer 2008) consistently finds differences in attitudes towards military service across 
population segments, and military advertising is heavily oriented towards establishing brand 
identity.
3 
Whereas standard monopsony models consider an employer selecting an amount of labor 
L while facing an upward-sloping inverse supply function, in our setting it is more natural to 
model the military as choosing a wage level w and other incentives in order to satisfy a readiness 
constraint at minimum cost.  Employment is determined by the supply function L(w,I,j,X) where 
I represents other incentives such as enlistment bonuses and educational benefits that are chosen 
by the military at the time of enlistment, j represents the exogenous actions of other firms in the 
market, and X represents supply-shifters such as demographic characteristics related to 
eligibility. C(I) is the cost function for incentives other than the wage.  The military’s 
minimization problem is: 
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where R(L) is the function mapping the number of personnel to readiness and R is the minimum 
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R() has no natural units, but rescaling it so that λ=1 expresses readiness in monetary terms.  
Rearranging this first-order condition then yields the familiar expression for the “exploitation” 
                                                 







, where ε is the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the own-
firm wage.  Including wages of other firms in j allows for Bertrand-style competition, in which 
firms strategically set prices conditional on the actions of their competitors and quantities are 
revealed.  Alternatively, controlling for competitor employment levels assumes Cournot 
interactions. 
  A richer model of monposonistic behavior might consider dynamic wage-setting 
behavior.  In our empirical implementation we focus on the market for new hires, which 
minimizes the dynamic nature of the supply decision given that almost two-thirds of enlistments 
occur when enlistees are between the ages of 18-20. Conceptually, we view our data as 
representing repeated realizations of equilibrium in the supply market.  Additionally, although 
some discussions of monopsonistic behavior (Ransom 1993) model wage setting over the entire 
period of the employment relationship, we focus on the initial employment decision.  Because 
the military invests heavily in training and its personnel in many cases develop skills deemed 
critical by the armed services, the military may be limited in its ability to extract wage surplus 
due to moving costs.  Asch et al. (2007) discuss research that more explicitly accounts for the 
possibility of re-enlistment. 
 
IV. Data Sources and Empirical Analysis 
 
We examine the degree of monopsony power by estimating reduced-form specifications for the 
supply function L, taking a state and quarter as the unit of observation.  This approach is similar 
to that of a number of papers examining monposony in other industries, including Sullivan (1989), Boal (1995), and Falch (2008), and is also the approach taken in the military manpower 
literature.  In particular, we estimate equations of the form: 
 
log(Lit)=β·log(wt) + α·Iit +δ·jit + γ·Xit + ωit + εit            (2) 
 
where Lit measures the number of enlistments of high-quality recruits in state i in time t, and w, I, 
J, and X are as defined above.  We parse the econometric error term into two components, a 
component that is observable to the military (which thus may influence short-run allocations of 
recruiting resources) but not to the researcher, ωit, and εit, which is the purely random error 
component.  
One challenge in empirically implementing (1) is determining the appropriate definition 
of the wage.  The earnings concept most closely equivalent to a civilian wage for military 
members is Regular Military Compensation (RMC), which includes basic pay, housing and food 
allowances, and the preferential tax treatment of military earnings.  However, potential recruits 
can also receive additional compensation in the form of cash enlistment bonuses and educational 
benefits, and the value of these benefits can be equivalent to a sizeable fraction of RMC.  In our 
empirical implementation, we use RMC as our primary wage measure, but also control for other 
forms of compensation, including bonuses and educational benefits.  A drawback of using RMC 
as a wage measure is that it is set nationally and thus precludes inclusion of a full set of 
year/quarter fixed effects in our regressions.  We instead include time trends to account for broad 
changes in the recruiting environment over time.  Additionally, many past studies of enlistment 
supply use the ratio of military to civilian wages as the wage measure, which effectively 
constrains the elasticity of the competitor wage to be equal to and opposite the own-wage elasticity.  Given that the theory does not imply such a restriction, we include the competitor 
wage as a separate component in j. 
 An additional concern with simple OLS regression estimates of (2) is that if ωit is 
correlated with the wage rate or incentives controlled by the military, estimates of β will be 
biased.  Although there is some possibility of correlation with wages, the institutional process 
governing wage setting may tend to minimize such endogeneity.  Military wages are only 
adjusted once a year and changes are authorized by Congress, with the executive branch 
presenting pay proposals months prior to enactment.  Changes are primarily determined based 
upon a formula that ties increases in pay to changes in the ECI.
4  Likely more problematic is 
endogeneity due to correlation between ω and I, because I includes factors such as the number of 
recruiters in a particular location and availability of enlistment bonuses and service-level college 
funds that can be adjusted in the short run based upon perceived supply shocks.
5  For example, 
faced with a shortfall in enlistments in FY2007, the Army introduced a new $20000 “quick ship” 
enlistment bonus in August 2007 in order to fill its quota before the end of the fiscal year.  Army 
recruiter counts also grew appreciably during 2005 and 2006, a period during which the war in 
Iraq was widely perceived as diminishing public enthusiasm for military service. 
Fortunately, our data include a measure which we can use to proxy for ωit.  For each 
location and time period the military services set a goal for the desired number of enlistments, 
and compensation and promotion of recruiters is tied to meeting or surpassing this goal.  The 
goal thus reflects each service’s perception of the difficulty of recruiting based upon all available 
information.  Under the weak assumption that the goal is increasing in ωit, we are able to 
                                                 
4 For example, in 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006 the actual pay raise was the same as that recommended by the 
formula, ECI+.5%. 
5 The Montgomery G.I. Bill is administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs and eligibility for this program is 
not controlled by the individual services. eliminate the bias in estimating β.  To see this, let Goalit = g(ωit,Iit), then ωit = g
-1(Goalit,Iit)  
Although the precise nature of g
-1() is unknown, it can be captured non-parametrically by 
including a high-order polynomial in the goal and I in equation (2).  This removes endogeneity 
arising from ωit.
6  The notion that goals increase when there are supply shocks that are 
observable to the military but which may be otherwise unobservable seems intuitively plausible. 
Our data cover 1998-2007 and are drawn from a number of sources.  Data on enlistments, 
bonuses, and recruiters are taken from recruiting databases and microdata files on recruits 
maintained by the individual services.  Demographic information is drawn primarily from the 
CPS.  Table 2 provides descriptions and summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis.  
We include the number of production recruiters, the proportion of new recruits who are given 
enlistment bonuses, and the proportion of new recruits who are offered the service college funds 
in I.
7 We also control for casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan and the maximum G.I. Bill benefit--
both variables that are measured nationally—to capture other factors likely to affect the 
desirability of military service.  As our measure of competitor behavior we use average wages 
for high school graduates calculated from the CPS.  All of our regressions also include 
population, a time trend, and state and quarter fixed effects as additional controls. 
Table 3 presents our basic empirical estimates for the Army.  The wage elasticity is 
estimated to be 2.22 and is highly statistically significant.  This estimate is appreciably larger 
than past estimates for the Army.  The coefficients on the included control variables are 
generally of a sign and magnitude that accord with intuition.  A 10% increase in production 
                                                 
6 Our control function approach has parallels in the production function estimation literature, as in Olley and Pakes 
(1996).  Dertouzos (1985) provides a more detailed discussion of the use of goals as a control variable. 
7 Enlistment bonuses are cash bonuses given to new recruits and are typically based on the length of the contract 
signed, timing of entry, and the occupational role chosen by the enlistee.  The Army, Marines, and Navy also 
maintain college funds that provide educational benefits that are added on the those provided through the 
Montgomery G.I. Bill program.  The college fund benefits are generally used after members depart military service. recruiters yields a 4% increase in high-quality contracts, a statistically significant effect.  
Contracts also increase with expansions of enlistment bonuses, service-level college funds, and 
increases in G.I. Bill benefits.  Increases in our proxy for competitor wages are associated with 
decreases in enlistments, although this effect is not statistically significant.  Our estimates also 
suggest an important effect of casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan on enlistments.  During the first 
half of 2007 there was an average of 313 quarterly casualties, which would translate into an 11% 
drop in high quality contracts. 
The estimates in the leftmost column of Table 3 make no attempt to account for 
endogeneity arising from ωit.  The major concern regarding wt and ωit is one of reverse causality, 
in which low numbers of enlistments induce policymakers to increase the military wage.  One 
simple diagnostic for reverse causality is to include leads of the wage variable as additional 
explanatory variables in (2).  If wage adjustments are being driven by a poor recruiting 
environment, we would expect to observe larger wage increases after periods of fewer recruits, 
which would induce a correlation between current enlistments and future wages.  However, 
when we estimated a version of (2) including a lead of the wage as an additional explanatory 
variable, the estimated coefficient on the lead term was -.005 with a t-statistic of only -0.03. 
The right column of Table 3 attempts to account for endogeneity of other variable 
recruiting resources using the control function approach described previously.  We include a 
polynomial with a full set of first- through third-degree interactions between goals, recruiters, 
enlistment bonuses, and service-level college funds as our control function.  Although α is not 
identified when including the control function in (2), β, δ, and γ can be consistently estimated 
and then α can be recovered by regressing log(Lit) - β ˆ ·log(wt) - δ ˆ ·jit - γˆ·Xit on Iit. As expected, attempting to account for endogeneity increases the estimated wage 
elasticity.  The increase is modest, however, with the elasticity rising .2 to 2.42.  The new 
elasticity does not lie outside of the 95% confidence interval of the original estimate.  Many of 
the coefficients on the other control variables remain similar under the control function 
specification. 
Table 4 examines the robustness of these findings to changes in specification.  
Specification 1 includes the employment rate in place of the average civilian wage as the 
measure of competitive behavior.  Specification 2 re-estimates the model including a full set of 
state-specific time trends.  Specification 3 adds additional controls for demographic factors that 
may affect supply, including the veteran and non-citizen share of the population, the crime rate, 
and the obesity rate.  Veterans and immigrants have been shown to be more likely to recommend 
military service to young adults and obesity and prior criminal activity can directly disqualify 
individuals from military service.  Specifications 4 and 5 separate the sample into the periods 
before and after the invasion of Iraq in Q2-2003 to examine whether this important policy shift 
affected supply response for the Army. 
Controlling for employment as opposed to wage increases the estimated elasticity 
somewhat, but it remains relatively large and statistically significant.  The unreported coefficient 
on local employment is also statistically significant and implies that a 1% increase in the local 
employment rate generates a 2.5% decrease in high-quality enlistments.  Allowing a more 
flexible form for the time series of enlistments similarly decreases the elasticity estimates, 
although they remain above 2.  Controlling for a wider set of demographic factors that may 
affect the supply curve (specification 3) actually increases the elasticity slightly. The difference in wage elasticities between the pre-invasion and post-invasion period is 
striking.  In the pre-invasion period, the estimated elasticity of 1.35 is close to the recent 
estimates of Warner and Simon (2005) and Gelber (2007).  Elasticities are around 2 in the post-
invasion period, an increase of roughly 50%.  Our finding of an increase in elasticities since the 
beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom is consonant with the analysis of Warner and Simon 
(2007), who estimate a greater relative pay elasticity in 2004-2005 than in previous years.  The 
increase in demand for personnel arising from the expansion of combat operations appears to 
have shifted equilibrium towards a more elastic region of the supply curve.  It also seems 
plausible that changes in the non-pecuniary aspects of Army service, such as the prospect of long 
deployments and increased risks to personal safety, may now limit the ability of the Army to 
attract those who add high amounts of value relative to the offered wage. 
Table 5 presents elasticity estimates for the Navy estimated similarly.  The first column 
estimates the basic specification accounting for endogeneity, the second column includes a 
broader set of controls, and the third and fourth columns bifurcate the sample into pre- and post-
invasion periods.  Navy elasticities are appreciably below those of the Army.  Controlling for a 
broad set of demographic factors, the Navy supply elasticity is .6 with a p-value below .01.  One 
explanation for this pattern concerns differentiation—although the military services are in 
general fairly different from other employers, within the military the Army and Marines are 
relatively similar.  The Navy, in contrast, has different occupations and deployment patterns than 
the other services.  Sea duty is likely to attract different types of recruits.  The greater degree of 
employer differentiation of the Navy may mute supply responses to changes in its offered wage. 
Unlike the Army, there is also little evidence that supply elasticities for the Navy have 
changed appreciably since the beginning of the Iraq War.  The post-invasion elasticity estimate of .51 is not statistically distinguishable from the pre-invasion elasticity of .46.  Given that the 
tempo of operations for the Navy has been less affected by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and risks to naval personnel have not changed substantially, this stability of the supply 
relationship is perhaps not highly surprising. 
  Might supply elasticity vary across states?  Individuals with a high sense of obligation 
towards military service might be inclined to enlist regardless of the financial incentives of 
service.  Labor would be elastically supplied to the military in locations with many such 
individuals.
8  As an additional test of our estimation approach, we identify a proxy for tastes for 
military service and ask whether we can obtain elasticity estimates that are consistent with our 
expectations as to which groups should be most responsive to pay. 
  In June 2005 SurveyUSA conducted a poll of 600 adults in each of the 50 states asking, 
“Do you think the United States needs or does not need a military draft?” Individuals who 
believe that the military should be able to compel citizens to serve should be willing to supply 
labor regardless of the wage, which would translate into a low labor supply elasticity.  In states 
in which there is less support for obligatory military service, we would expect that small 
departures from the competitive wage would have large negative effects on enlistments.  
Average approval in the poll was 25% with a 4% margin of error.  We code states with 30% or 
higher approval as being highly supportive of the draft and those with 20% or fewer citizens 
approving as having low support of the draft.
9 
                                                 
8 For example, recruiting has been highly successful in Guam, a U.S. territory in the Pacific which was occupied by 
the Japanese during World War II and which has a deep-rooted tradition of military service.  An Army National 
Guard recruiter in Guam recently stated, “I have got 12 people who want to join up this month, but I can only 
process three of them because of lack of doctors to give them physicals. We can afford to be picky.” (Hardin 2008) 
9 An alternative interpretation of the survey responses is as an indication of the respondent’s impression of the 
likelihood that the military will be able to meet its personnel requirements.  If respondents believe that individuals in 
their state are unlikely to respond to incentives (low elasticity), they may perceive a greater need for a draft.  If they 
believe that changes in pay will yield large changes in recruits, they may find a draft less important.  In either case, 
we predict higher elasticities in areas with low draft support.   Table 5 reports our estimates for the Army and Navy allowing for different elasticities 
according to draft support.  As predicted, labor supply elasticity is decreasing in the support for 
the draft for both services.  For the Army, the elasticity estimates of 3.5 for low approval states 
and 1.0 for high approval states are statistically different from the elasticity in the average state.  
For the Navy, although we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of equal elasticities in the 
average and high approval states, elasticities are statistically significantly higher in the low 
approval states.  These elasticity differences across states are also practically large, and imply 
that the Army has considerably lower wage-setting power in states with low support for 
mandatory service.  More generally, it is interesting to observe that we can connect measured 




Is the U.S. military a monopsonist?  Common sense and a large body of empirical evidence 
suggest an affirmative answer.  Consonant with prior research, in this paper we estimate wage 
elasticities that are fairly low relative to other industries for both the Army and Navy.  The 
relative insensitivity of wage with respect to enlistments suggests that the military may be able to 
offer wages that are below the marginal recruit’s value.  However, there is evidence the Army 
faces higher supply elasticities since the onset of hostilities in Iraq, which would tend to erode 
the Army’s ability to obtain this surplus.  In the Navy, which is more highly differentiated than 
the Army and which has been less impacted by Iraq, supply elasticities have remained more 
stable. 
In some respects standard monopsony models appears less satisfactory in explaining the 
behavior of the military.  Using the “exploitation” parameter as a simple measure of monopsony gains would imply that even in a period of eroding support Army gains have ranged from 50-
74% of the wage bill.  For the Navy, our supply curve estimates imply persistent gains of over 
100%.  However, one difficulty in literally interpreting a monopsony model in the case of the 
military is ambiguity regarding how different levels of personnel map into the military’s 
objective function.  We have modeled the military as attempting to satisfy a uni-dimensional 
readiness constraint, but in actuality the military is likely to simultaneously pursue multiple 
objectives regarding its force structure.  For example, the observations that the services expend 
resources to promote racial diversity and engage in little to no price discrimination despite 
possessing considerable amounts of information about potential recruits seem at odds with a 
depiction of the military as a strict monopsonist.  Non-pecuniary considerations may lead the 
military to operate more closely to the competitive equilibrium than is suggested by monopsony 
models. 
Additionally, although a substantial body of research has focused on estimating supply 
elasticities for the military, we know much less about why wage elasticities differ across groups 
and across time.  From a social standpoint a higher elasticity may imply that the Army must 
operate closer to the competitive equilibrium, which could benefit future service members.  At 
the same time, the changing nature of enlistment supply is likely to impact the costs of providing 
high-quality national defense going forward.References 
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VA.Table 1: Prior Studies Estimating Military Labor Supply Elasticities 
 
 
Study  Population  Elasticity  
Estimate 
Gelber (2007)  DoD  1.50 
Warner and Simon (2007)  Army  0.70 
Warner, Simon, and Payne (2001)  Army  1.05 
Bohn and Schmitz (1996)  Navy  1.64 
Hogan et. al. (1996)  Navy  0.55 
Berner and Daula (1993)  Army  0.48 
Kearl, Horne, and Gilroy (1990)  Army  0.15 
Warner (1990)  Army, Navy  0.51—Army 
2.04—Navy 
Smith et. al. (1990)  Army  1.20 
Daula and Smith (1985)  Army  0.82 
Dale and Golroy (1985)  Army  3.90 
Ash, Udis, and McNown (1983)  DoD, Army, and Navy  0.66—DoD 
0.88—Army 
0.88—Navy 
Goldberg (1979)  Navy  0.13 
 Table 2: Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable  N  Mean  Std  Min  Max 
Military-Wide           
  Basic Pay  1900  25723  2300  21812  29746 
  Maximum G.I. Bill Beneift  1900  28226  6303  17483  35647 
  Casualties in Iraq/Afghanistan  1900  108  118  0  362 
Army           
  High-Quality Contracts  1900  478  383  7  1664 
  # of Recruiters  1900  239  184  5  693 
  % Receiving Enlistment Bonus  1900  0.379  0.152  0.000  0.870 
  % Receiving Army College Fund  1900  0.135  0.057  0.000  0.447 
Navy           
  High-Quality Contracts  1900  366  321  3  1290 
  # of Recruiters  1700  199  175  3  614 
  % Receiving Enlistment Bonus  1750  0.479  0.127  0.026  0.938 
  % Receiving Navy College Fund  1750  0.103  0.089  0.000  0.609 
Demographic           
  Population Aged 18-30  1900  406839  451188  36963  2713587 
  Average Weekly Wage--HS Grad  1900  558  46  372  775 
  Non-Military Employment  1900  382463  422225  34898  2556206 
  % Male  1900  0.514  0.008  0.476  0.550 
  % White  1900  0.634  0.161  0.202  0.969 
  % Black  1900  0.144  0.094  0.005  0.451 
  % Hispanic  1900  0.159  0.140  0.007  0.501 
  % Veteran  1900  0.150  0.024  0.090  0.219 
  % Noncitizen  1900  0.117  0.077  0.000  0.283 
  % Adults Obese  1896  0.207  0.032  0.087  0.320 
  Crime Rate (Crimes/100000 Pop)  1900  3626  844  1560  6428 Table 3: Enlistment Supply Estimates for the Army 
 
 
Explanatory Variable  (I)  (II) 
Log(Military Wage)  2.22**  2.43** 
   (.160)  (.194) 
Log(Recruiters)  .440**  .435** 
   (.0518)  (.0491) 
Log(GI Bill Benefit)  1.22**  1.21** 
   (.0970)  (.101) 
% Receiving Enlistment Bonus  .261**  .264** 
   (.0490)  (.0523) 
% Receiving College Fund  .351**  .339** 
   (.103)  (.106) 
Log(Market Wage)  -.0727  -.0390 
   (.0634)  (.0796) 
Log(Population)  -.398  -.193 
   (.288)  (.308) 
Casualty Count  -3.73E-4**  -3.17E-4* 
   (1.25E-4)  (1.56E-4) 
N  1900  1900 
R
2  .975  .977 
Include polynomial of Army goal as 
a control function? 
No  Yes 
 
 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from a regression of log total high quality enlistments on log military 
wage and additional controls.  The unit of observation is a state and quarter and observations cover the period from 
Q1-1998-Q2-2007.  Each column reports coefficient estimates from a unique regression.  Specification II includes a 
third-order polynomial with interactions between goals, recruiters, share receiving enlistment bonuses, and share 
receiving the Army college fund as a control function. In addition to the reported controls, both regressions include a 
set of state fixed effects, quarter dummies, and a time trend as additional control variables.  Regressions are 
population weighted; estimation without weighting yields similar results.  Standard errors clustered on state are 
reported in parenthesis.  * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and ** at the 1% level. 




Elasticity  N  R
2 
1. Control for competitor employment (Cournot)  1.91**  1900  .985 
   (.143)     
2. Include state trends  2.07**  1900  .984 
   (.155)     
3. Include additional controls  2.29**  1895  .978 
   (.161)     
4. Limit sample to pre-Iraq invasion  1.35**  1050  .985 
   (.363)     
5. Limit sample to post-Iraq invasion  2.02**  850  .988 
   (.269)     
 
 
Notes: See notes for Table 3.  Specification 1 replaces the control for log market wage with the log employment 
rate.  Specification 3 includes the log crime rate; adult obesity rate; log veteran and noncitizen population shares; 
and male, Black, White, and Hispanic population shares as additional control covariates.   
 Table 5: Navy Estimates 
 
 
Explanatory Variable  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Log(Military Wage)  .418**  .613**  .456*  .509* 
   (.156)  (.125)  (.229)  (.215) 
Log(Recruiters)  .550**  .540**  .316**  .591** 
   (.0434)  (.0440)  (.0819)  (.0472) 
Log(GI Bill Benefit)  -.0523  -.146*  1.17**  .160 
   (.0586)  (.0608)  (.309)  (.134) 
% Receiving Enlistment Bonus  .163**  .151**  .0742  .138** 
   (.0289)  (.0287)  (.0530)  (.0305) 
% Receiving College Fund  .0433  .00374  .641**  .0694 
   (.103)  (.104)  (.131)  (.113) 
Log(Market Wage)  -.152**  -.0534  -.125†  .0333 
   (.0587)  (.0560)  (.0725)  (.0889) 
Casualty Count  -2.92E-4**  -4.45E-4**  -3.85E-4**  1.59E-4 
   (6.94E-5)  (6.66E-5)  (1.21E-4)  (2.84E-4) 
N  1700  1695  850  850 
R
2  .989  .991  .993  .990 
Include polynomial of Army goal as 
a control function? 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Include state trends and additional 
controls? 
No  Yes  No  No 
Limit to pre-invasion period?  No  No  Yes  No 
Limit to post-invasion period?  No  No  No  Yes 
 
 
Notes: This table replicates the analyses from Table 3 and 4 for the Navy.  See notes for Tables 3 and 4.  The 
additional controls included in column II are the same as those in specification 3 of Table 4.  The time period of 
available data for the Navy is Q1-1999-Q2-2007.Table 6: Estimates by Degree of Approval for the Draft 
 
 
Elasticity for States With:  Army  Navy 
Low draft approval  3.47**  1.10** 
   (.201)  (.115) 
Average draft approval  2.07**  .640** 
   (.160)  (.131) 
High draft approval  1.00**  .472 
   (.171)  (.469) 
N  1900  1700 
R
2  .984  .991 
 
 
Note: This table reports wage elasticity estimates from regression of log high quality enlistments on log military 
wages interacted with state-level indicators for low, average, and high support of the draft.  Army and Navy 
elasticities are estimated separately.  See notes for Table 3.  Draft approval is based upon the results of a June 2005 
survey in which 600 residents of each state were asked, “Do you think the United States needs or does not need a 
military draft?” Average approval was 25% with a 4% margin of error.  States with low draft approval are states in 
which 20% or fewer residents agreed with the statement; states with high approval have 30% or greater agreement.  
These regressions include the control variables used in Table 3 and a full set of state trends. 